Iranian barrages hit Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel on Tuesday. Pete Hegseth promised maximum force from the Pentagon podium. A leaked CIA assessment reveals the United States knew - before the first missile flew - that military action in Iran was unlikely to trigger regime change. The war just got harder to end than it was to start.
Aerial operations have intensified across the Iran theater. (Unsplash)
Ten days after the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran on February 28, the conflict has reached a threshold no war planner publicly predicted this fast: a near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a new and reportedly more hardline supreme leader in Tehran, and a Pentagon promising not de-escalation but maximum escalation.
Tuesday began with Iran launching simultaneous attacks across multiple theaters - Bahrain's capital took a direct hit on a residential building, killing a 29-year-old woman and wounding eight. Saudi Arabia destroyed two drones over its oil-rich eastern region. Kuwait's National Guard intercepted six incoming drones. In the UAE, firefighters battled a blaze in the industrial city of Ruwais - home to major petrochemical plants - after an Iranian drone strike, officials confirmed. No injuries were reported there, but the symbolic target was not subtle: Ruwais is one of the Middle East's largest refinery complexes.
In Israel, air raid sirens activated across Jerusalem and the sound of explosions reached Tel Aviv as Iron Dome and Arrow intercept systems worked to clear incoming barrages from Iranian territory.
The pattern is clear. Iran is not attacking military targets alone. It is going after the economic infrastructure of every country aligned with the United States and Israel - oil terminals, industrial hubs, shipping lanes, civilian morale. The Strait of Hormuz strategy, in particular, is a siege weapon being deployed against the entire global economy.
The Pentagon has pledged its highest-intensity operations yet for Tuesday. (Unsplash)
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth appeared before cameras on Tuesday and delivered the clearest signal yet that the United States intends to press harder, not pull back.
"Today will be yet again our most intense day of strikes inside Iran: the most fighters, the most bombers, the most strikes, intelligence more refined and better than ever."
The statement came with an odd qualifier: just before making it, Hegseth acknowledged that "the last 24 hours have seen Iran fire the lowest amount of missiles they have fired yet." Whether that reflects degraded Iranian capacity or deliberate restraint ahead of a larger wave remains contested among analysts.
Gen. Dan Caine, now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided a rare operational breakdown. U.S. forces have hit more than 5,000 targets inside Iran over the first ten days of the campaign. The operation has three stated objectives: destroying Iran's ballistic missile and drone production and launch capability; neutralizing Iran's naval capacity to enforce a Hormuz blockade; and striking "deeper into Iran's military and industrial base."
What Caine did not say - and what senior officials have been careful to avoid confirming - is whether those 5,000 strikes have meaningfully degraded Iran's ability to fire drones and missiles. Tuesday's simultaneous multi-country attacks suggest the answer is: not enough, not yet.
The administration's posture is essentially maximum pressure through maximum air power, with the stated belief that enough sustained destruction will produce an Iranian climb-down. Critics inside the intelligence community, however, had a different view before the first bomb fell.
A classified National Intelligence Council assessment completed in February 2026 - before the war began on Feb. 28 - concluded that neither limited airstrikes nor a prolonged military campaign would likely result in regime change in Iran, even if the current leadership was killed. (AP, March 10, 2026)
The single most damaging revelation of Day 10 was not on any battlefield. It came from a leak to the Associated Press and confirmed by The Washington Post and The New York Times: the National Intelligence Council's pre-war assessment, completed in February, concluded that American military action was not likely to produce a new government in Iran.
The classified report, described by two people familiar with its findings who spoke on condition of anonymity, determined that no unified or sufficiently powerful opposition coalition existed to step into power if the Islamic Republic's leadership was killed. It further concluded that Iran's deep state - the civil service, the Revolutionary Guard command structure, the clerical establishment - would move to preserve continuity of government even if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was eliminated.
Khamenei was killed in the war's opening salvo. The intelligence assessment proved accurate within 72 hours: Iran's Assembly of Experts convened and selected Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's son and a man widely described by Iran specialists as holding views even more hardline than his father's. Rather than collapsing, the Iranian state replaced its leader with someone less likely to negotiate.
The assessment's existence cuts directly against the administration's public rationale for the war. Trump and senior officials have shifted justifications repeatedly - nuclear program rollback, preemption of ballistic missile attack, general deterrence - while Trump himself has repeatedly suggested he wants to see Iran governed differently. Hegseth, meanwhile, has publicly insisted the war is not about regime change.
Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard's office declined to comment on the classified report. Gabbard previously fired the NIC's acting chairperson last year after a different declassified NIC memo contradicted administration claims used to justify deportations of Venezuelan immigrants. The pattern is consistent: when the intelligence community disagrees with administration policy, the response has not been to revisit the policy.
Tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has effectively collapsed. Saudi Aramco is rerouting through the East-West pipeline. (Unsplash)
The Strait of Hormuz is 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point. Through it passes roughly 20 percent of the world's traded oil. Iran's Revolutionary Guard announced Tuesday that it "will not allow the export of even a single liter of oil from the region to the hostile side and its partners until further notice." The Guard is enforcing that declaration with mines, drones, and direct attacks on merchant vessels.
The International Maritime Organization has confirmed at least seven sailors killed in attacks near the strait. On Tuesday, a bulk carrier likely came under attack in the Persian Gulf off the UAE coast, with the vessel's captain reporting a splash and a loud bang from close range, according to the British military's monitoring center.
Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser confirmed that tankers are being rerouted entirely to avoid the Strait of Hormuz. The company's East-West pipeline - which crosses the Arabian Peninsula to deliver oil to the Red Sea port of Yanbu - will reach its full capacity of 7 million barrels per day this week. That pipeline existed precisely for this scenario, but it cannot replace the full volume of Hormuz traffic.
"The situation at the Strait of Hormuz is blocking sizable volumes of oil from the whole region. If this takes a long time, that will have serious impact on the global economy." - Amin Nasser, Saudi Aramco CEO
Brent crude hit nearly $120 a barrel on Monday - a 24 percent increase since the war began on February 28 - before pulling back to approximately $90 on Tuesday. The gap reflects traders pricing in both the risk premium and the rerouting solutions being deployed. But $90 oil is still far above pre-war levels, and a sustained closure of Hormuz has no clean historical parallel in terms of duration.
Trump issued a characteristically aggressive post on social media warning that if Iran does "anything that stops the flow of Oil within the Strait of Hormuz, they will be hit by the United States of America TWENTY TIMES HARDER." The statement created a significant problem: Iran has already effectively stopped the flow of oil through Hormuz. The threat arrived after the triggering event.
Iran's simultaneous multi-theater attack on Tuesday represents a deliberate widening of the conflict's geographic scope. The targeting of Bahrain's capital Manama is particularly significant. Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet at Naval Support Activity Bahrain, and the attack on a residential building - killing a civilian woman - signals Iran's willingness to strike civilian infrastructure in a country hosting American military assets.
The attack on Ruwais in the UAE hits one of the region's most important industrial concentrations. The city hosts Borouge - a joint venture between Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Austria's Borealis - as well as significant refinery capacity and the UAE's largest gas processing plant. A successful strike on Ruwais petrochemical infrastructure would ripple through global supply chains for plastics, fertilizers, and chemicals far beyond oil.
Iran's parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf was unambiguous about Tehran's intentions, writing on X that Iran was "definitely not looking for a ceasefire." Senior security official Ali Larijani went further, issuing what appeared to be a direct personal threat toward Trump: "Iran doesn't fear your empty threats. Even those bigger than you couldn't eliminate Iran. Be careful not to get eliminated yourself."
Iran has been accused of plotting assassination attempts against Trump dating back to his first term. Larijani's statement - made publicly on social media - represents an escalation in rhetoric that the U.S. Secret Service will be analyzing carefully.
In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed hospital and health system leaders and vowed the strikes would continue. "Our aim is to bring the Iranian people to cast off the yoke of tyranny, ultimately it depends on them," Netanyahu said. "There is no doubt that with the actions taken so far, we are breaking their bones."
On the ground, Iran-backed militias in Iraq launched fresh attacks on U.S. positions in the country, and Hezbollah in Lebanon resumed cross-border fire into northern Israel after a period of relative quiet. The war's geography continues to expand, pulling in adjacent fronts that were previously contained.
The most consequential ambiguity in Washington on Tuesday was not military but political: Donald Trump cannot seem to give a consistent answer on how long the Iran war will last, and the mixed signals are beginning to matter strategically.
Within the span of a few hours on Tuesday, Trump described the conflict as "going to be a short-term excursion," while also having previously said it could last a month or longer. At a press conference at Doral, he gave answers that prompted multiple outlets - NPR, CNN, The Hill - to run headlines explicitly about the contradictions.
The incoherence has practical consequences. Allies in the Gulf are trying to make decisions about economic planning, military cooperation, and civilian evacuation based on signals from Washington. If Trump says the war ends "pretty quickly" and then Hegseth announces the "most intense day of strikes," those two messages cannot both be true simultaneously, and the region is watching which one reflects actual policy.
Republican members of Congress briefed by the administration have told reporters that Trump conveyed confidence the war would be short. Those same members are now watching Iranian drones reach Bahrain and the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed on Day 10. The divergence between the private briefings and the visible facts is generating quiet anxiety in the Capitol.
The intelligence assessment - that regime change was unlikely before the war started - deepens the problem. If Iran's government does not collapse, and U.S. intelligence said it would not, then what is the definition of American success in this conflict? Nobody in the administration has provided a clean answer.
Amid the missile counts and oil charts, one of Tuesday's more humanly striking developments involved the Iranian women's national soccer team. Five members of the squad - which had traveled to Australia before the war began for the Women's Asian Cup - were granted asylum by Australian Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke.
The 26-member team had attracted attention before their asylum applications when players declined to sing the Iranian national anthem before their first match. The gesture was widely interpreted as a statement against the regime. After Iran was eliminated over the weekend, the team faced the prospect of returning to a country under sustained bombardment. Burke offered all 26 players asylum and posted photos on social media of the women smiling and clapping as he signed the documents.
It is unclear if or when the remaining 21 players will take up Australia's offer. The episode crystallizes a humanitarian dimension of the conflict that the military briefings tend to obscure: millions of Iranians are living through a war they did not choose, conducted by a government many have opposed for decades, and now being bombed by a country that claims it is striking on their behalf.
The intelligence assessment's finding - that no opposition coalition exists capable of replacing the Islamic Republic - reflects this reality. The Iranian state is not universally popular. But "not popular" and "primed to collapse under bombing" are two different conditions. A generation of Iranians who lived through the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s know something about enduring external pressure and hardening around a government they might otherwise resent.
The war's geographic spread and lack of defined end conditions point toward a conflict longer than either Washington or Tel Aviv has publicly acknowledged. (Unsplash)
The endgame problem is now the central problem of this war. Hegseth can promise the "most intense day of strikes" as many times as the calendar allows. But intensity is not the same as a defined objective with a defined threshold of success.
The administration has offered multiple and at times contradictory rationales: nuclear rollback, preemption of missile threat, regime change, not regime change, short-term excursion, month-long campaign. None of these cohere into a single strategy with a measurable end state.
Iran, for its part, has supplied a coherent counter-strategy: economic pain through Hormuz disruption, political pain through multi-country attacks that strain American alliances, and time. Tehran's bet is that global economic pressure will force a negotiated settlement before the Revolutionary Guard's military capacity is meaningfully degraded. The National Intelligence Council's pre-war assessment suggests U.S. analysts agreed the Iranian state had the institutional resilience to outlast a bombing campaign.
The question being asked in European and Asian capitals - and increasingly in Washington - is whether the parties to this conflict have defined what "winning" looks like in terms that can actually be achieved. Hegseth's daily escalation rhetoric, and Iran's daily multi-country attacks, suggest both sides are still searching for an answer.
The Strait of Hormuz will not stay closed forever. But the longer it remains disrupted, the deeper the global economic scarring. Saudi Aramco's Nasser said it plainly: "If this takes a long time, that will have serious impact on the global economy." That "if" is doing a lot of work on Day 10 of a war that multiple parties promised would be short.
Ten days in. No end condition defined. The most intense day of strikes still ahead. And an intelligence community that warned - before any of it began - that the outcome Washington was implicitly counting on was unlikely to materialize. The war is not going according to plan, because no plan was fully articulated before the missiles flew.
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